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I
INTRODUCTION
T HE ADMINISTRATIVE process during the past ten years has
provoked anew discussion and reform proposals. Dissatisfaction
with the status quo in administrative procedures is reflected in the
approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in late 1961 of a substantially revised, Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
the Act or Model Act), which prior to revision was initially con-
sidered in 1944 and adopted in 1946.2 Substantial portions of the
Model Act had been adopted as of the close of 1962 in seven states
and the revised Model Act had been adopted in one state.3
Current interest in the reform of administrative law on both a
federal and state level can trace itself back to the Task Force Report
* B.S. 1942, Marshall College; LL.B. 1947, Duke University; J.S.D. 1950, Yale Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; Visiting Professor of Law, Duke
University, 1963.
1 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 206
(1961). Hereinafter references to the revised Model Act and the official comments
thereto will be by section number only.
HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 202
(1946).
3HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 357
(1962). Although the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws only claimed eight
states (Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin)
for the Model Act and Rhode Island for the revised Model Act at the end of 1962,
other states have undoubtedly been influenced by the Model Act, and one study lists
sixteen states as having adopted significant portions of the Model Act. KENTUCKY
LEGIsLATIVE REsEARCH COMM'N, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES LAW IN KENTUCKY (1962).
Dean Stason tabulates four states as adopting the Model Act substantially verbatim
and eight additional states as having adopted substantial portions of the Model Act.
Administrative Law News No. 3, Nov. 1961, p. 2, col. 1.
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on Legal Services and Procedures4 of the second Hoover Committee.
This report has inspired proposals to drastically revise the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act5 (hereinafter referred to as the APA) on the
federal level and the Model Act on the state level. Although not
adopted completely, the Task Force recommendations are the basis
for the current (but no longer so recent, since they were initially
proposed in 1956)0 proposals (hereinafter referred to as the ABA
proposals) of the American Bar Association Special Committee on
Legal Services and Procedure3
The ABA proposals include proposals (1) to establish an office
of administrative procedure and legal services which would be
within the executive branch but independent of any department or
agency thereof, (2) to establish a corps of independent hearing
commissioners, (3) to establish as part of the judiciary, specialized
administrative courts to have jurisdiction over certain adjudicatory
functions presently being performed by the Federal Trade Commis-
.sion and the National Labor Relations Board, and (4) to adopt the
Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, drastically
revising and superseding the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Several of the proposed code provisions have found their way into
the revised Model Act and are commented upon separately below.s
Those who read the newspapers may recall that in 1957 an
administrative law professor left his ivory tower at New York Univer-
sity to become counsel to a special subcommittee of the House long
enough to shake up the administrative process, particularly with
respect to alleged influenced peddling, to such an extent that it soon
became expedient for him to resign his position with the subcommit-
tee.9 The subcommittee's investigations continued on a more sub-
dued tone for a period of time.'0 The Senate established its coun-
terpart subcommittee (hereinafter referred to as the Carroll com-
4 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T
(1953-1955), TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE (1955).
60 Stat. 289 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958). The Administrative Procedure Act
will hereinafter be cited as APA.
0 See Report of the special Comm. on Legal Services and Procedure, 81 A.B.A.
REP. 491 (1956). The Code of Administrative Procedure, which is included among
these proposals, is hereinafter cited as the Proposed Code of Administrative Procedure.
7 For an excellent discussion of proposals to reform the administrative process in-
cluding the American Bar Assodation proposals, see Woll, Administrative Law Reform:
Proposals and Prospects, 41 NRa. L. REv. 687 (1962).
s See text of article at notes 36, 45, 63, 66, 70, 74, 77, 85, 87, 89, 94, 100, 126 infra.
9 SCHWARTZ, TnE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMIssIONS (1959).
10 Woll, supra note 7, at 715.
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mittee) under the chairmanship of former Senator John Carroll of
Colorado." The Carroll committee conducted extensive hearings
pertaining to the administrative process in general, considering
among other matters the ABA proposals. 12 The Carroll committee
has made several recommendations, some of which are considered
below.'3 A subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the House
is presently holding hearings on the ABA proposals and other aspects
of the administrative process.
In September of 1960 Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia was requested by President
Eisenhower to initiate the organization of a conference on adminis-
trative procedures. This program was implemented by President
Kennedy, who established, by Executive Order No. 10934 of April
13, 1961, the Administrative Conference of the United States. The
conference consisted of representatives from both inside and outside
the administrative agencies, including lawyers, professors and others
with a special interest in administrative procedures. This conference
studied a number of administrative law areas and problems under
the terms of the executive order which terminated in December of
1962. There have been legislative proposals to make the Adminis-
trative Conference a permanent one. At least three important
recommendations have come out of this conference; these recommen-
dations are discussed below14 in the context of the problems to which
they relate.
Immediately after President Kennedy was elected, he designated
James Landis, former Dean of Harvard Law School and former
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to prepare
a special report on the regulatory agencies.' 5 Some of the Landis
recommendations were reflected in reorganization plans for certain
agencies submitted by the President and adopted by Congress with
modification as discussed below.' 6
In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that at least much talk
11 Ibid. The present chairman of this subcommittee is Senator Edward V. Long of
Missouri.
12 Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, Administrative Practice and Procedure, S. REP. No. 168, 87th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1961).
23 See text of article at notes 20, 28, 46, 82, 96, 132 infra.
II See text of article at notes 46, 55, 82, 118 infra.
Ir LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO TIlE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Dec. 1960);
reprinted by the SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
SENATE COMMa. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960).
16 See text of article at note 47 infra.
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is going on in this area; how productive or constructive it is may be
another matter. One critic of the administrative law writers has
characterized much of the repetitive discussion as "an exercise in
pouring old beer into new steins-producing a stale, flat potion."' 7
It is with some temerity that the author runs these same risks, but
such risks cannot be avoided since the revised Model Act is based
on these same repetitive discussions.
The Model Act, as revised, concerns itself with administrative
adjudication18 (referred to as "contested cases" and defined to in-
clude rate-making and licensing), rule making, and judicial review
of administrative adjudication and rule making. In the area of
rule making, the Act prescribes procedures for the adoption and
publication of rules and for judicial review of rules to determine
their validity. In the area of administrative adjudication, the Act
prescribes the right to a hearing, the "pleadings," the right to pre-
sent evidence and to cross-examine, rules of evidence, and the form,
manner of reaching, and bases for the agency decision. The Act
provides for judicial review of agency decisions in contested cases,
and prescribes the procedure, mechanics and record on review, and
the scope of judicial review. The Act also contains certain provisions
limited in application to licensing.
II
GoaLs AND OBJECTIVES
Before exploring the Act in detail, it may be well to outline
objectives and goals. In this emotionally charged area, all too fre-
quently personal prejudices pass for informed judgment largely
The recommendation of the Conference and the selected studies of the Conference
have been recently published as S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963). S. 1664,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963), which provides for a permanent Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, recently was the subject of a Senate hearing. Hearing on S.
1664 Before the Subcommitte on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963).
17 Massel, The Regulatory Process, 26 LAw & CONTEN'I. PROB. 181 (1961).
-18 Throughout the text reference is made to administrative adjudication in order to
refer to the area labelled "contested case" by the revised Model Act. The term "ad-
judication," preferred as it is more descriptive, is the term usually employed on the
federal level, and "contested case" will suggest to many a contest as distinguished
from a consent or default proceeding. It should be noted, however, that "contested
case" under the revised Model Act (§ 112) is broader than "adjudication" under the
APA since it encompasses certain rate and other proceedings which are not "adjudi-
cation" under the APA, but which under the APA are subject to some of the same
,hearing requirements. The term "adjudication" as used herein is used in the broad
sense to cover all proceedings involving a hearing on the record and which on the
federal level would be subject to the hearing requirements of APA §§ 7-8.
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because goals have not been clarified. The author believes that
there would be substantial agreement on the following goals:
1. The goal of a model act in this area should be to improve
and not to destroy, harass or hamper the administrative process.
This requires recognition of the fact that administrative agencies
are here to stay. It also requires consideration of administrative
law problems without regard to the substantive rights that are af-
fected by administrative action. All too often the alleged objec-
tions to administrative practices are a mere camouflage for substan-
tive objections to the laws that are being administered. The sub-
stantive battles are to be fought in the legislature, and, assuming
that the legislature has resolved the substantive problems in terms
of a particular program, the concern should be with the fairness
and efficiency of the procedures used in order to implement the
substantive program.19
2. Another goal is recognition of the fact that the administrative
process has its own character and values and is in itself a method (and
the one preferred by the legislature) of handling a particular prob-
lem. Judicial methods should be adapted only to the extent they
have worked well for the judiciary and will work well in the context
of the particular problem. 20 Trial-type adversary proceedings charac-
teristic of most judicial proceedings are primarily useful for deter-
mining adjudicative facts and should not be imposed on proceed-
ings that essentially involve questions of policy determination.
8. The goal in the area of administrative adjudication should be
to provide a minimum in the way of fair hearing procedures without
judicializing the administrative process. Assuming the appropriate-
ness of a trial-type hearing, administrative due process should include
(without undue formality) adequate notice of the issues, adequate
"
5This does not suggest that one need not be concerned with the impact of ad-
ministrative procedures on an agency's ability to accomplish its substantive functions.
See Massel, supra note 17, at 181-82.
"
0The report of the Carroll committee states this well: "Agencies and departments
have been bedeviled by an insistence that their procedures resemble as closely as
possible court techniques. Too little emphasis has been placed upon the fact that
administrative determinations involve the interests of many ... parties; that the facts
to be determined depend not upon resolving conflicts between witnesses as to who
did what, and when, and to whom, but upon predictions of the future based upon
evaluation of statistical and scientific data. Most of all, the issue is often not how to
resolve a conflict between adversaries, but to determine what the public interest de-
Tmands shall be made to happen in the future. The unavoidable result of forcing such
'a-decision to be made in a proceeding contorted into a judicial mold is a long and
complicated but often inadequate record .... ." Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 12, at 2.
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opportunity to prepare, adequate opportunity to discover and pre-
sent evidence, and the right to cross-examine and confront opposing
witnesses. Persons affected by administrative action are, in short,
entitled to their day in the administrative court.
4. The agency decision in administrative adjudication should
be rendered by unbiased persons2 1 who have personally considered
the record, have not been contaminated by participating in the prose-
cution of the case, and who have rationalized their decision in a
written opinion setting forth the basis for their conclusions.
5. Each agency should have rules of practice governing the
agency's procedures in administrative adjudication. These rules
of practice, as other rules, should be readily available to all parties.
6. Procedures for the promulgation of rules and regulations by
agencies should assure participation by persons affected by such
rules and regulations and should assure publication, indexing and
codification of the rules and regulations.
7. Reform of administrative law should have due regard for the
peculiar advantages of the administrative process growing out of the
special competence of the administrators in their area of jurisdiction
and growing out of the institutional approach to such problems.
One of the principal advantages of the administrative agency is the
fact that the agency head does not have to depend on his own limited
knowledge but has available to him a staff of trained personnel that
can bring a more specialized and studied approach to the problems
with which the agency must deal. Of the goals listed, this perhaps
will be the most controversial since it infringes on some persons'
ideal of separation of functions.22
III
SURVEY OF THE MODEL ACT'S CONTURBUTIONS
The Model Act and its recent revision can, if carefully con-
sidered, become the basis for administrative law reform in states
21 This does not, of course, require neutral agency members; obviously, members
of the agency should be sympathetic with the objectives of the legislation, and they
are not precluded from prejudgments as to what constitute the desideratum of law
and policy. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). Some courts are all too
prone to assume that administrative due process cannot adequately protect parties.
See, e.g., the assumption of the Tenth Circuit to the effect that administrative pro-
cedures within the Dep't of Interior for resolving issues under the Mineral Leasing
Act may destroy the security of titles to oil and gas leases. Pan American Petroleum
Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649, 655 (10th Cir. 1960).
22 See text of article at notes 69-91 infra.
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either without legislation in this area or with antiquated or in-
adequate legislation. The revised Model Act makes a significant
contribution in the following areas:
1. In the area of administrative adjudication, many state admin-
istrative agencies have not adopted rules of practice governing the
procedures to be followed in the administrative adjudication, and
in other instances inadequate and incomplete rules of practice have
been adopted. The Model Act remedies these deficiencies by first
providing for minimum procedures governing all administrative ad-
judication and, in addition, requiring each agency to adopt rules of
practice supplementing the procedures provided. In some state
agencies, the Model Act will provide procedures and guidance in
areas for which no regular procedures or governing standards were
previously available.
2. One of the major contributions of the Model Act and the
revised Model Act is in the area of rule making. It provides a
uniform procedure for the adoption of rules that assures notice to
interested parties with an adequate opportunity to present conflicting
viewpoints and with provision for filing, indexing, compiling, pub-
lishing, and keeping current the publication of rules.
3. In many instances decisions of state administrative agencies
are rendered in administrative adjudications without setting forth
specific findings of fact or conclusions of law or a sufficient rationali-
zation for the decision, thereby making difficult the process of judi-
cial review and creating the impression of arbitrary action. The
Model Act as revised requires decisions in administrative adjudica-
tion to be in writing and to set forth the findings of facts and con-
clusions of law; the findings of fact must be set forth concisely and
explicitly.
4. Administrative agencies on the state level have undoubtedly
in many instances been deficient in failing to develop in administra-
tive adjudication an appropriate record of the proceedings. The
lack of such record creates problems with respect to judicial review
and does not contribute to informed administrative decisions. The
Model Act prescribes the content of the record, but as we shall see,
it is deficient in failing to provide for adequate reporting of testi-
mony and in failing to take into consideration related matters
essential to the development of an appropriate record.2 3
23 See text of article at notes 56-62, 67 infra.
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5. The Model Act contains judicial review provisions pertaining
to rule making and administrative adjudication and, althoilgh, as
noted below, 24 it is somewhat inadequate in these respects it does
take a long step forward toward eliminating unnecessary confusion
in the selection of the appropriate form of proceeding for judicial
review. The Model Act also prescribes certain standards for con-
trolling scope of teview which are discussed below.
IV
SuRvEY OF THE REVISED ACT'S SHORTCOMINGS
Some of the proponents2 5 of the Model Act have recognized that
each state will have to tailor the Model Act to its own peculiar needs
in the area of administrative law. A model act in conception is
intended as a general guide rather than a prescription for uni-
formity. Certainly, administrative law problems differ in nature
and degree from state to state, depending in part upon the size of the
particular state, and from agency to agency depending somewhat
upon the functions performed and the particular work load en-
countered. In addition, each state ordinarily has to consider con-
stitutional limitations that may preclude or at least require modi-
fication of proposed changes in procedures, particularly with respect
to judicial review.
Of crucial importance in reforming state administrative pro-
cedures is recognition of the fact that those concerned with the
administrative process on a day-to-day basis must be made par-
ticipants in proposals for reform. The revised Model Act does not
reflect a drafting procedure that sought or seriously considered view-
points of state administrators most vitally concerned with the impact
of the proposed Act.20 Accordingly, states contemplating legisla-
tion in this area would be well advised to make representatives of
the administrative agencies participants in the drafting process.
This is not to suggest that the viewpoints of such administrative
personnel must always be controlling, and there undoubtedly are
2' See text of article at note 115 infra.
25 This has been recognized by Raoul Berger, Chairman of the Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association, among others. See The Administrative Law
News No. 3, Nov. 1961, p. 1, col. 1. Mr. Berger, however, presumably would not agree
with the major revisions suggested in this article.
"The special committee on revisions of the Model Act included E. Blythe Stason,
Chairman, John B. Boatwright, Jr. of Richmond, Virginia, James J. Burke of Madison,
Wisconsin, and Charles Wheeler of Frankfort, Kentucky.
[Vol. 1963:,593
Vol.1963: 593] ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 601
areas in which the administrators need to be prodded 27 and their
viewpoints disregarded if effective reform is to be achieved. How-
ever, these should be areas in which the need for reform has been
established rather than proposals based on a doctrinaire approach
28
without adequate empirical bases. Reform in the administrative
process should not preclude the administrators from carrying out
their responsibilities. The agency has the responsibility and the
duty to enforce and administer vigorously and sympathetically the
substantive law entrusted to it; the agency must have the tools neces-
sary to cut through obstacles that represent primarily delaying tactics
and retreating action on the part of the regulated. As we note be-
low,29 the revised Model Act poses a number of such obstacles and it
is inconceivable to this author that this most recent revision of the
Act will achieve widespread acceptance on the part of those respon-
sible for carrying out administrative programs unless it is substan-
tially revised in certain material respects.
The proposed Model Act adopts many of the restrictive provi-
sions recommended by the Task Force and included among the
ABA proposals, but it completely disregards thinking and practices
going on within agencies themselves and arising out of the recom-
mendations of the Administrative Conference and others in areas
such as ex parte consultation, delegation of decision and reviewing
powers, and limitations on the review of decisions of hearing officers.
In addition, in many respects the Model Act as revised fails to deal
at all with a number of significant administrative law problems.
Irrespective of particular viewpoints, since the Model Act necessarily
reflects a compromise of many viewpoints, those intimately con-
cerned with the drafting of legislation for a particular state should
be familiar with the ferment of ideas so characteristic of the modern
administrative law field. The author has participated in one pro-
gram for drafting a state administrative procedure act3 0 and con-
27 See particularly discussion in text of article at note 58 infra.
2s Compare the following statement of the Carroll committee relating to the Pro-
posed Code of Administrative Procedure: "The Committee is frank to observe that
there is little in the way of concrete evidence pointing to any need for increased
formalities." Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judidary, supra note 12 at 10.
20 See discussion in text of article at notes 65-66 and notes 69-91 infra.
30 See Bloomenthal, Administrative Law in Wyoming-An Introduction and Pre.
liminary Report, 16 Wyo. L.J. 191 (1962); COMM. ON ADMimNTRATvE LAW OF THE
WYOMING BAR ASS'N, A PROPOSED WYOMING ADMINInTRATMV PROCEDURE ACT (Dec. 14,
1962). The author must report that these efforts have not been successful to date in
part because of disagreement as to whether changes in judicial review procedures
should be accomplished by legislation or by adoption of supreme court rules.
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cludes on the basis of this participation that it is possible to adapt
the Model Act so as to serve as a basis for administrative reform.
This conclusion is buttressed by studies being made in other states.81
V
COVERAGE AND ADMINISTRATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
In large measures the Model Act as revised is self-executing and
requires no more than compliance with its provisions by the agencies
covered under the Act's definition of the term "agency."3 2 This
definition is all inclusive on the state level. However, the Model
Act does not include municipal and county administrative agencies,
although the official comment to the Act suggests that it may be
desirable to add some of these. There are typically on the county
and municipal level several agencies, such as zoning boards of adjust-
ments and civil service commissions, which exercise significant
powers of adjudication with a sufficient degree of regularity to war-
rant their inclusion within the coverage of a state administrative
procedure act. In addition, administrative action by county and
local agencies frequently gives rise to problems of judicial review
and, if the judicial review provisions are expanded, as suggested
below, to cover administrative action in addition to rule making
and contested cases, 33 the judicial review provisions should be ex-
tended to similar administrative action on the county and municipal
level.
There are certain functions under the Model Act which have
to be performed either by an existing agency or department or by a
new agency. The principal function involved is the publication
and compilation of rules and proposed rules. There are in addition,
however, other functions that could be vested with profit in a par-
ticular agency or department. The approach of the Model Act is
to vest centralized functions that have to be performed under the
Act in the office of the secretary of state or in another agency to
be designated by the legislature. The Kentucky proposed act34
places these functions in its legislative research commission. The
author would suggest consideration be given by states revamping
3
'See, for example, KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CO1MM'N, supra note 3.
32 Revised Model Act § 1 (1).
'3 See text of article at note 108 infra.
3'KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoMMi'N, supra note 3, at 57.
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their administrative procedures to the creation of a separate agency
(hereinafter referred to as the Administrative Procedures Commis-
sion) as part of the executive department which would have, among
others, the following functions:
1. To compile and publish rules and proposed rules, as required
under the Model Act.35
2. To gather statistics and other data relating to administrative
procedures and designed to lead to proposals or suggestions to im-
prove the efficiency of the administrative process.
8. To make studies for structural reorganization upon the re-
quest of a particular agency.
4. To advise particular agencies, upon their request, regarding
the handling of problems relating to administrative procedures and
law.
5. To control the selection, promotion, assignment, and general
supervision of hearing examiners.
On the federal level there is presently an Office of Administrative
Procedure within the United States Department of Justice. This
office performs some of the functions mentioned above, but it does
not have control over hearing examiners. The American Bar Asso-
ciation has proposed that the Office of Administrative Procedure or
a comparable office be made an independent agency in the executive
branch of the federal government, and the functions proposed to
be vested in this agency include control over the selection and super-
vision of hearing examiners.36 The draftsmen of administrative
procedures legislation may want to review other functions which
the ABA proposes to vest in the Office of Administrative Procedure
with the possible view of including some of these additional func-
tions in the proposed Administrative Procedures Commission.
VI
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION UNDER THE MODEL ACT
A. Rules of Practice
The first requirement for administrative adjudication is that the
agency have established procedures for conducting such adjudica-
tion, embodied in the form of rules of practice that are available to
35 Revised Model Act §§ 4, 5.
36 Proposed Code of Administrative Procedure, S. 600, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 204-11
(1959).
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all persons affected by such adjudication. The Model Act in itself
supplies a skeleton set of rules; the detail relating to implementation,
however, is quite properly left to the individual agencies. The
Model Act also affirmatively requires that each agency adopt rules
of practice.3 7 Most state agencies with substantial case loads un-
doubtedly have the personnel and facilities necessary in order to
adopt rules without outside assistance. However, many of the smaller
agencies may have inadequate staffs for this purpose, and there is
merit in the Oregon act 38 which provides that the attorney general
shall be required, upon request, to submit to the requesting agency
a proposed set of rules of practice to be considered for adoption by
the agency.
B. Presiding Officers
The Model Act is seriously deficient in that, although it assumes
that hearing officers may be appointed and apparently assumes that
the decision making power may be delegated, it makes no provision
for hearing officers and does not specify generally the powers to be
exercised by presiding officers, the weight to be afforded decisions of
the presiding officers, and the procedures for review of decisions of
presiding officers. These are matters which for the most part are
explicitly covered by the APA and involve areas of intense current
discussion, with many proposals being debated and with considerable
experimentation being undertaken by some of the federal adminis-
trative agencies. These problems on the state level have their own
peculiar character arising out of, among other things, the fact that
in many of the smaller licensing agencies, the members of the agency
have had no significant experience in presiding as "judicial" officers;
in many other agencies by virtue of constitutional or statutory pro-
visions ex officio members of the agency, such as the governor and
secretary of state, have to participate in the decision making process.
These additional factors give impetus to the need arising in all
agencies with a large case load of administrative adjudication or in
agencies in which the members have substantial and significant
additional functions to perform to have trained persons other than
the members of the agency, or perhaps only one member of the
agency, to preside at and conduct the administrative hearing. A
major consequence of employing the hearing examiner procedure
37 Revised Model Act § 2 (a) (2).
38 ORE. RFv. STAT. § 183.340 (1959).
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is that final decisions frequently are rendered based on a review of
the record by persons other than those who have actually heard the
testimony.
No one on the federal level disputes the need for hearing ex-
aminers or other procedures that permit someone other than the
complete agency membership to preside at hearings, but considerable
controversy rages as to (1) the qualifications, appointment, salaries,
and supervision of hearing examiners, (2) the extent to which de-
cisions of the hearing examiners or other presiding officers should
be binding upon the agency, and (3) the extent to which parties
should be entitled as a matter of right to an appeal to the agency
from such decisions. The Model Act is mute on all these matters.
There are undoubtedly a large number of state agencies which
have statutory authority to employ hearing officers and which have
well developed practices in this area. The Colorado act39 and Ken-
tucky proposed act4" both authorize the use of hearing examiners,
but they do not specify their qualifications or the manner of their
appointment. As a minimum, a proposed state administrative proce-
dure act should contain comparable provisions. The merit of this
approach is its flexibility in that it apparently permits any designated
employee to preside. Other and more preferable alternatives would
include the federal approach, which provides for a special class of
hearing examiners who are employees of the individual agencies but
somewhat insulated from agency influence 4 1 or the creation of a
separate class of hearing examiners who would be employed, super-
vised, and assigned to cases by the Administrative Procedures Com-
mission.42
The weight to be afforded decisions of hearing examiners and
the extent to which parties are entitled to review are necessarily
intertwined. Under the APA, with respect to matters resolved by
a trial type hearing, the decisions of the hearing examiners are sub-
ject to review as a matter of right and are not binding upon the
.agency.43 However, with respect to matters involving credibility of
30 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4 (3) (1960 Perm. Supp.).
4o KENTUCKY LEGISLATiVE RESEARCH CONMM'N, supra note 3, at 68.
42APA §§ 7, 11. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128
(1953). In such event provision should be made to permit the smaller agencies to
borrow hearing examiners from other agencies as needed.
'2 This follows one of the ABA proposals. See supra note 36.
43Depending upon classification of the case and the particular rule of practice
adopted by the agency, the examiner's decision is an initial decision or a recommended
decision, but in any event parties have the right to review by the agency. APA § 8 (a).
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witnesses, the reviewing court must consider the fact that the hear-
ing examiner reached the same or different (as may be appropriate)
conclusion in determining whether the findings of fact of the agency
are supported by substantial evidence.44 Under the ABA proposal,
hearing examiners' decisions are final unless reviewed, and the
agency cannot set aside findings of evidentiary facts (as distinguished
from ultimate conclusions of fact and questions of agency policy)
unless contrary to the weight of the evidence.45 A bill introduced by
Senator Carroll goes even further by authorizing review of the
hearing examiners' decision only if (1) a finding of fact is clearly
erroneous; (2) there is no governing legal precedent; (3) the de-
cision departs from governing laws, rules and precedent; (4) a sub-
stantial and important question of administrative policy or discre-
tion has been raised; or (5) prejudicial procedural error has been
committed.46 Under various reorganization acts pertaining to cer-
tain regulatory agencies (based in part on the Landis recommenda-
tions), the agency has discretion of the certiorari type to review; 47
review can be by employees or employee boards; 48 and in some
instances review exists as a matter of right, but it can be by employees
"Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493-94 (1951).
"5 Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1007 (c). For a discussion
of this and other provisions of the Proposed Code written by one of its proponents
see Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-The American Bar Asso-
ciation Program, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1961).
,6 S. 1734, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (a) (1961). The Administrative Conference of the
United States at its third plenary session held on April 3, 1962, adopted recommenda-
tions in support of a revised S. 1734. However, as revised, the agency would retain
discretion as to whether or not to grant review, and the statutory grounds listed in the
text would be controlling only as to a party's right to review.
'17 See Schultz, Progress and Problems in Agency Adjudication, 14 AD. L. R1v. 239
(1962), for an excellent discussion of legislation, reorganization plans, implementing
rules and general background. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1961 (5 U.S.C.A. § 133z-15
Supp. 1951-61) and Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961 (ibid.) permit the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board and the Federal Trade Commission respectively to delegate the power to
"determine" with discretionary review (but any two members of the board, that is one
less than a majority, may require agency review). Legislation adopted in 1962 permits
similar delegations to be made by the Securities and Exchange Commission; however, as
to certain types of commission action, review exists as a matter of right and in all in-
stances one member of the commission may require review. P.L. 87-592, 76 Stat. 394
(1962). The Atomic Energy Commission by regulation has adopted a discretionary
review procedure. 10 C.F.R. § 350 (1959). The Federal Trade Commission has exer-
cised its authority to limit review in accordance with the foregoing; both the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board continue to allow review
as a matter of right.
"The Interstate Commerce Commission procedures now utilize "appellate" em-
ployee review boards on a large scale. Authorization for such boards is contained in
§ 17 (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended in 1961. 75 Stat. 517 (1961), 49
U.S.C.A. § 17(b) (1961).
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or employee boards.49 A recent study by the ABA Committee on
Agency Adjudication tentatively concluded that many of the a priori
concerns as to shortcomings of employee review boards have not
materialized in practice."0 Somewhat belatedly there has been recog-
nition not only of the fact that S. 1734 would place an agency in a
straight jacket review-wise and contribute to the judicialization of the
administrative process, but it would also eliminate one of the most
important safeguards against administrative authoritarianism, to wit,
various levels of review as a matter of right.51 The use of employee
boards to reduce the work load of the agency, thereby allowing it to
concentrate on the more important cases, should permit agencies to
reduce the backlog of cases 2 without denying parties the right to
another level of review. Serious consideration should be given in
a proposed state act to providing for agency review as a matter of
right, retaining the advisory status of the hearing examiner's decision
but making his decision final unless appealed or reviewed by the
agency on its own motion, and permitting the agency to delegate its
review functions as it may determine to an employee or an employee
board.53
The Model Act makes no provision as to the functions and
powers of the presiding officer. The provisions of the APA54 which
relate to administering oaths, rules upon offers of proof, etc., could
serve as the basis for a comparable provision on the state level. Con-
sideration should also be given to areas in which pre-hearing con-
ferences might be better utilized in administrative adjudication. 5
," The Federal Communications Act, as amended in 1961, with respect to most adju-
dicatory proceedings permits review as a matter of right, but review may be performed
by employee boards which in the case of adjudication, as defined by the APA, must be
a three member board, the members of which meet certain statutory standards. 75
Stat. 420 (1961), 47 U.S.C.A. § 155 (d) (1961). There is a further limited right to
petition to the agency for review of the decision of the employee board with discre-
tionary right in the agency to deny further review. All of the statutes referred to in
notes 47-49 preserve the requirement that proceedings subject to § 7 (a) of the APA
can be presided over and conducted by either the agency, one of its members, or a
qualified hearing examiner.
50 Schultz, supra note 47, at 258.
"I Id. at 258-59.
12Ibid.
53The amendment to the Federal Communications Act referred to at note 49
supra could well serve as a model.
" APA § 7 (b). The Model Act also fails to assure parties right to counsel. Com-
pare APA § 6 (a) with a bill introduced in the 88th Cong., 1st Sess. by Senator Edward
V. Long. Press Release from office of Senator Edward V. Long dated May 8, 1963.
"The Administrative Conference has recommended (Recommendation No. 19)
utilization in some cases of documentary presentation of cases by the parties prior to
hearing so as to limit the hearing to cross-examination. Subject to the rules of evi-
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C. Investigations and Discovery
The regulatory administrative agency has dramatized the need
for, and the results that can be accomplished with, the subpoena
power used as an implement for conducting investigations. The
subpoena is also utilized to obtain essential data relating to the adopt-
ing of rules and legislation as well as in connection with the regu-
latory type adjudication. In addition, it is essential to an appro-
priate record that the subpoena power be available to all the parties
to an administrative adjudication and not merely to the agency and
its staff.
Since most agency statutes on the state level provide for the
subpoena power, the more serious problems are (1) making the
subpoena power available to the parties other than the agency, and
(2) providing for pre-hearing discovery. The Model Act contains no
provisions pertaining to issuing subpoenas, making the subpoena
power available to parties, or directly providing for discovery.
Discovery by parties other than the agencies, in fact, is a largely
neglected area of administrative law on both the state and federal
level. Since the administrative agencies have powerful discovery
weapons available to them, a staff of trained investigators to effec-
tively use such weapons, and generally the time and money to in-
vestigate thoroughly, the administrative adjudication involving the
agency against the individual is decidedly one-sided from the stand-
point of discovery techniques.
Discovery is one area in which the administrators definitely need
prodding. Procedures for discovery against the agency as a matter
of right and without the approval of the agency seldom exist. In
some instances even the very limited discovery procedures available
in criminal actions56 have been held to be unavailable to respondents
in administrative adjudication. Although administrative agencies
have begrudgingly, if at all, extended discovery procedures to other
participants to the proceedings, the agencies have been expanding
their power to investigate and now have, as is only appropriate,
extremely powerful investigatory tools.57 Administrative adjudica-
dence (see text of article at note 65 infra) the revised Model Act § 10 permits evi-
dence to be received in written form if the "hearing will be expedited and the interests
of the parties will not be prejudiced substantially."
"' See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1957). But see Com-'
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 254 F.2d 314, 328 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
5 U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing
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tion of the type involving litigation between two or more private
parties would also be facilitated by discovery procedures comparable
to those now generally provided under modem rules of procedure
in civil actions.58
Consideration should be given in drafting a proposed adminis-
trative procedure act to extending the subpoena power to all adminis-
trative adjudications, to providing for issuance of the subpoenas
by the agency or presiding officer upon request of any party, and
to providing for a uniform enforcement procedure. Enforcement of
the subpoena should require a court proceeding, and the Kentucky
proposed act provision, 9 designating the court of a particular judi-
cial district to hear all subpoena enforcement cases, warrants con-
sideration. The proposed statute should make clear, as does the
Kentucky proposed act, that the enforcement proceeding may be
initiated by any party.60
Rules of some state agencies provide for the taking of deposi-
tions, but these provisions frequently require the consent of the
agency and often appear to pertain only to the taking of testimony
as distinguished from discovery. The Kentucky proposed act6'
would require that the notice in a contested case include notice of
(and an opportunity to examine) all relevant staff memoranda and
data which are not made confidential or privileged by statute. This
provision undoubtedly will be criticized as making available the
product of the agency's work to the other parties and thereby destroy-
ing the element of surprise, thus making it more difficult for the
agency to win its cases. Since agencies are manned by human beings,
to the extent they are participants in contested cases, those responsi-
ble for preparing the agency's case usually like to win. The function
of agencies, however, is not to win cases merely for the sake of win-
ning, and in the last analysis, the administrative process will gain
more respect and be stronger if it does make its work product avail-
able within the limitations relating to confidential and privileged
information. An alternative approach, broader and preferable in the
sense that it permits discovery against the agency and other parties
to the proceeding, would be to provide that rules comparable to those
Co. v. Walling, 827 U.S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 817 U.S. 501
(1948).
11 FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37, 45 (d), and comparable state rules of civil procedure can be
adapted for this purpose.
50 KENTUCKY LEcIsLATrE RaSEARctl COMM'N, supra note 8, at 68.00 Ibid.
01 bid.
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in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be applicable to all adminis-
trative adjudication. The Federal Rules would require some minor
adaptations in order to apply to administrative adjudication, and
such modification should make clear the fact that, to the extent the
agency is an adversary party, it shall be deemed a party for discovery
purposes. The extent to which the agency's files and staff are pro-
tected as confidential or privileged should be left for determination
by the courts on an ad hoc basis.02
D. Evidence, Official Notice, the Record and Findings
The exclusionary rules of evidence have not generally been ap-
plied in administrative proceedings on the state level. However, the
"'residium rule" adopted in some states does require that decisions be
supported by a residium of competent evidence. 3 Section 10 of the
Model Act, revised following the ABA proposals, would require
the rules of evidence as applied in non-jury civil cases to be applied
in adjudication, with a proviso that when facts are not otherwise
provable, evidence may be admitted in contravention of these rules
if it is the type of evidence commonly relied upon by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The approach of the
:federal APA seems preferable to the author since it admits all
Televant evidence which is not repetitious and merely requires that
The decision be based on reliable, probative and substantial evidence.
.Reliable, probative and substantial evidence should be defined as
ithe type of evidence commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent
inen in the conduct of their serious affairs.
The exclusionary rules of evidence were designed to protect liti-
gants against juries which of necessity have limited experience in
evaluating evidence. Most authorities on the law of evidence feel
that many exclusionary rules need drastic revision,04 and there is no
general agreement as to what the non-jury rules are or that they
even exist.65 The revised Model Act provision seems tailored to
produce interminable objections and argument as to what are the
non-jury rules of evidence and other extraneous matters (e.g., is a
fact otherwise provable) rather than concentrating on the relevancy,
02 See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.15 (1958), for compilation of the case law
relating to such privilege.
63 Carroll v. KInickerbrocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 118 N.E. 507 (1916); DAVIs, op.
cit. supra note 62, at § 14.12.
"Id. § 14.10.
"Id. § 14.04. The revised Model Act § 10 (1) also appropriately requires agencies
to give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law.
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reliability and weight of the evidence. Any statutory enactment in
this area should also put to rest the residium rule with respect to
administrative adjudications.
The revised Model Act66 restricts official notice to generally
recognized technical or scientific facts within the agency's specialized
knowledge. A preferable provision in the author's judgment would
be to permit official notice of any fact within the agency's files or
records or specialized knowledge, provided the parties are afforded
an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. The agency should
not be precluded from utilizing the storehouse of information it has
accumulated in its files or otherwise. The revised Model Act ap-
propriately requires notice of, and an opportunity to rebut, evi-
dence officially noticed and apparently contemplates that such notice
and opportunity to rebut will be afforded prior to the final decision;
however, by the inclusion of an "or otherwise" proviso, agencies
apparently could give such notice in the decision itself, and this
proviso should be excluded.
The record developed in administrative adjudication is extremely
important, for it ordinarily determines the basis for the decision and
controls in part the nature and extent of judicial review. In the
event all the members of the agency have not heard the case, it is
essential that the proceedings be reported both for purposes of
judicial review and in order to permit the entire agency to partici-
pate in the decision. A substantial number of the better staffed
state agencies undoubtedly report proceedings as a matter of course.
The Model Act,6 7 although it provides that the record shall include
"evidence received or considered," does not, unfortunately, expressly
provide that all contested cases be reported. The Model Act pro-
vision relating to transcription of the record should be enlarged so
as to require that such transcription be furnished upon request of
any party and upon payment of reasonable costs established by the
agency.
Objection may be made to the reporting requirement because of
the costs involved. The suggested provision, it should be noted,
would merely require that the proceedings be reported rather than
stenographically recorded, as the Kentucky proposed act requires.
The purpose is to permit magnetic tape or other machine record-
ing, and hence the cost would not exceed the cost of purchasing or
:0 Revised Model Act § 10 (4).
7 Id. § 9 (e) (2).
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leasing such a machine and accessories. While stenographic report-
ing is undoubtedly preferable and will undoubtedly continue to be
used by agencies with available personnel, the recommended pro-
vision will at least assure some semblance of a record in all contested
cases. It should also be noted that the suggested provision is limited
to administrative adjudication; other requirements are more ap-
propriate to rule making and to executive action. Executive action
is usually reflected by minutes relating to the proceeding, and it
does not appear appropriate to legislate requirements in this area.
Section 12 of the revised Model Act requires that any final de-
cision in a contested case shall set forth findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statu-
tory language, must be accompanied by a concise and explicit state-
ment of the underlying facts supporting the findings. These pro-
visions should not only help dispel impressions of arbitrary action,
but in some instances at least they should also limit such action and
facilitate judicial review. The revised Model Act also provides that if
proposed findings of fact are submitted by the parties in accordance
with the agency's rules, the decision must include a ruling upon each
proposed finding. This provision, in the author's judgment, serves
no useful function and will result in cluttering written opinions with
extraneous material and meaningless "boiler plate." Section 12 of
the Model Act also requires that notice of the final decision in con-
tested cases be given to the parties and that a copy be mailed to each
party requesting same. Further provision should be made requiring
that each agency maintain an appropriately indexed public file of
all its decisions in contested cases and that they publish, as required
by the Kentucky proposed act, a summary of all such decisions in a
monthly bulletin distributed in connection with the publication of
proposed rules.68
E. The Institutional Decision
The institutional decision grows out of the needs and charac-
teristics of the administrative process, and since the procedures differ
from judicial procedures, there are continual efforts by lawyers to
compel conformity to the judicial model. This explains in part
proposals already discussed to make each hearing examiner in effect
a trial court judge and to impose the non-jury exclusionary rules of
68 KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, supra note 3, at 85. See also text of
article at note 99 infra.
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evidence.8 9 Although some advocates of the ABA proposals prefer
avoiding terms like "judicialize," 7° the Task Force of the Hoover
Committee candidly recognized "formalization of administrative
procedures along judicial lines"7 1 as their primary objective. The
area which particularly disturbs the "judicializers" is the adminis-
trative decision making process, and it is in this area that the re-
vised Model Act attempts to do something about it. There are many
related aspects of the problem, and it may be well to attempt to out-
line them before proceeding to a detailed discussion.
First, there is the problem as to what constitutes the record upon
which decisions in administrative adjudication are to be based and
the extent to which the record must be read or considered by the
agency itself. There is also the problem-related to the foregoing
only because the revised Model Act chooses to make them related-
of the extent to which parties are to have the right to present briefs
and to make oral argument.
Second, there is the problem of the extent to which the agency
members may be assisted by the staff in sifting, analyzing, and evalu-
ating the record and in preparing the written opinion.
Third, there is a problem of the extent to which parties and
their representatives may confer ex parte with agency personnel who
participate in the decision making process.
Fourth, there is a problem as to the extent to which members
of the agency may consult with their staff in reaching decisions.
Fifth, there is a problem of separation of functions, cutting across
all of the foregoing problems, involving the extent to which those
who have participated in the investigation, preparation or presenta-
tion of the case on behalf of the staff may participate in the decision
making process.
Let us consider the problems seriatim, reserving separation of
functions for individual treatment.
(1) The revised Model Act requires that "findings of fact shall
be based exclusively on the evidence and matters officially noticed." 72
If the reference is to adjudicative or evidentiary facts as distinguished
from ultimate conclusions of fact and legislative facts pertaining to
policy, no one is likely to quarrel with this provision. The deter-
40 See text of article at notes 51, 65 supra.
0 oBenjamin, supra note 45, at 212.
1 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Gov'T,
supra note 4, at 138.12 Revised Model Act § 9 (g).
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ruination, for example, that certain pricing practices have been
engaged in is susceptible of record proof; the impact of these prices
on competitors may or may not be, and whether such pricing prac-
tices are desirable probably can never be determined on the basis
of evidence alone. The Model Act does not require that the agency
members read the record; however, in an effort to require the agency
members to master the record, the revised Model Act requires, in
the event less than a majority of the agency participating in the
decision have read the record or heard the case, that a proposed
decision be prepared by a person who conducted the hearing or who
has read the record7 3 The proposed decision must be served upon
the parties who then are to be afforded an opportunity to file excep-
tions and present briefs and oral arguments.74 All of this is justified
in order to assure that those who decide have "at the very least" re-
ceived briefs and heard oral argument. 5  Ironically, under the
Model Act the parties have no assurance of an opportunity to present
briefs as a matter of right in the event a majority have read the
record.
Certainly a modification of the APA procedure7 relating to the
rendering of agency decision is preferable to the proposed revised
Model Act procedure:
(a) A recommended decision by the presiding officer (ordinarily the
hearing examiner) which will become the final decision of the agency
unless appealed from or reviewed by the agency on its own motion.
(b) Parties as a matter of right to be afforded an opportunity to
submit exceptions to the recommended decision supported by briefs.
The brief is counsel's most effective opportunity to organize and effec-
tively present his argument, and this opportunity should not be denied
under any circumstances.
(c) Oral argument at the discretion of the agency.
(2) Under the revised Model Act, agency members or others
who render decisions in contested cases as to an "issue of fact" can
consult ex parte only other members of the agency or one or more
personal assistants.77 This provision appears, among other things,
7 Id. § 11.
U Ibid.
75 Comment § 11, revised Model Act.
76 The APA provisions are found at § 8 (b) of that act.
7 Revised Model Act § 13. However, consultation is permitted by § 13 to the
extent necessary for the agency to dispose of ex parte matters authorized by law
and presumably this will permit consultation for the purpose, for example, of deter-
mining whether or not a proceeding should be initiated.
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to be designed to preclude the use of a separate opinion writing or
review section to sift and analyze the record for the agency members
or to -write agency decisions, although conceivably they could write
those portions of the agency's decision that relate to questions of
law. On the federal level, opinion writing and the use of opinion
writers is a well developed art. Many federal agencies have, under
various names, an opinion writing division. This practice is also
used to a considerable extent by some state administrative agencies.
Dean Landis, 73 among others, objects to the fact that opinions in
administrative adjudications are frequently written by persons other
than the members of the agency. Aside from the question of sepa-
ration of functions, the principal objection to opinion writers is
based on the assumption that the process of writing the opinion in
itself contributes to a more informed judgment. It is argued in
this area that it is commonplace for one's thinking to be substantially
changed or modified when an attempt is made to rationalize con-
clusions and formulate ideas in the written form. Undoubtedly,
there is a great deal that can be said for this viewpoint, but, in the
author's opinion, it is somewhat exaggerated. Assuming, for ex-
ample, that the agency is composed of more than one person, at best
only one of the members is going to have the direct benefit of this
intellectual exercise. But more important, if the members of the
agency regard the party who assisted in writing the decision as being
merely a tool to assist them and if they accept and exercise their
responsibility for the decision itself, all of the members of the
agency by reviewing, supervising, and instructing the opinion writer
or writers will experience much of the same intellectual process. In
the last analysis, the extent to which this intellectual activity is
experienced and beneficial will depend upon the personnel involved.
Utilization of an opinion writing division permits much of the me-
chanical burden of preparing a written opinion to be assumed by
others in routine cases and will permit agencies in some of their more
complex cases to assign one of their members to write the opinion.79
The alternative for an agency with a large case load is either to in-
crease its backlog or to give less consideration to the merits of the
case and more to the process of writing the opinion or, as in the case
of the National Labor Relations Board which is subject to compara-
78 LANDIS, supra note 15, at 19-20, 39, 47.
70 The Securities and Exchange Commission, apparently sensitive to the criticism of
Landis and others, has very commendably commenced following this practice.
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ble restrictions, ° to have in effect several separate opinion writing
divisions (personal assistants), one for each agency member.
(3)- (4) The revelation of the Harris Special Subcommittee on
Legislative Oversight,81 relating to ex parte contacts between agency
members and the regulated with reference to improper attempts to
influence decisions, has given rise to a number of proposals. Al-
though general legislation has not been adopted by Congress in this
area, the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently an-
nounced a statement of policy82 which adopts the recommendations
of the Administrative Conference so as to preclude ex parte com-
munications with respect to "on-the-record" proceedings as between
persons outside the Commission and "decisional" employees" of the
Commission.
The revised Model Act precludes the decisional employees of
the agency from communicating ex parte with any person outside
of the agency representing a party to the proceeding as to any issue
of fact or law.84 No one denies that improper influence, like sin, is
to be combated on all fronts, and if the Model Act provision went
no further, it would be a salutary one. However, as to issues of fact,
the decisional employees are also precluded from consulting ex parte
with members of the staff except that agency members may consult
with other agency members and with their personal assistants.8 5 The
official comment to this section refers to "litigious" facts, and it is not
clear whether "facts" are merely evidentiary facts. If such is the case,
10 The Taft-Hartley Act precludes the board from employing attorneys for the
purpose of reviewing transcripts or preparing opinions except such functions may be
performed by legal assistants assigned to individual board members. 61 Stat. 139-40
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 154 (a) (1958).
81 Hearings on Investigation of Regulatory Commissions and Agencies Before a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
82 Securities Act Release No. 4600 (April 26, 1963), CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 7 6,192.
The Carroll committee recommended the enactment of a statute containing both
criminal and civil sanctions prohibiting improper ex parte communication. See Sub-
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, supra note 12, at 4.
"Decisional employees are defined so as to include Commission members, the
hearing officer assigned to the case, members of the staff of the Office of Opinion Writ-
ing and legal and executive assistants to Commission members. Securities Act Release
No. 4600, supra note 82.
"1 Revised Model Act § 13.
"5 Ibid. The agency may consult with persons both inside and outside of the agency
under this provision other than a person representing one of the parties as to questions
of law. Accordingly, the agency is free to consult its own staff and also personnel of
other agencies as to questions of law.
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the main impact of the provision would be to preclude or restrict
the use of an opinion writing division.
However, on the assumption that "facts" also include, or that the
Act may be construed so as to include, ultimate facts and legislative
facts, agencies would be precluded from utilizing the expertise of
their staffs in reaching policy determinations implicit in much of
administrative adjudication. The Act does recognize the right of
the agency to utilize its "experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge . . . in the evaluation of the evidence."8 6
One of the principal advantages of the institutional approach is that
agency members are not limited by their own technical and spe-
cialized knowledge but have available a staff of experts for consulta-
tion. Frank recognition is needed of the fact that any decision-
maker, whether judicial or administrative, brings to each decision the
totality of his knowledge. Agencies should not be precluded from
utilizing their staffs for the purpose of resolving and formulating
policy incident to adjudication even though factual assumptions,
determinations, and predictions are, as is often the case, implicit in
policy formulation.
A related provision of the revised Model Act8 7 requires with
respect to adjudication that the record include "all staff memoranda
or data submitted to the hearing officer or members of the agency
in connection with their consideration of the case." The extent to
which staff memoranda can be considered at all by the agency on
matters other than questions of law depends upon the appropriate
construction of the limitations on staff consultations referred to
immediately above. The Act is not clear at what point such staff
memoranda become a part of the record, and if, as apparently may
be the case,88 they do not become part of the record until after
the decision is rendered, their significance will be limited primarily
to petitions for reconsideration and to judicial review. The inclu-
sion of such staff memoranda in the record will give rise to a myriad
of false issues and misdirected argument-that is, argument against
the memoranda and data rather than against the agency's decision.
80 Revised Model Act § 10 (4).
8 7 Id. § 9 (e) (7).
"'This appears to follow from the fact that the offidal comment to § 9 sug-
gests that it might be desirable to go further than the proposed provision and re-
quire that staff memoranda be submitted for the record in time to permit adverse
parties to offer evidence in reply. If staff memoranda are officially noticed, the parties
must be given an opportunity to rebut to the same extent as other matters officially
noticed. See supra note 66.
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In addition, it will impose such administrative inconvenience from
the standpoint of determining the memoranda and data to be con-
sidered by the agency that, agencies are likely to avoid all non-record
consultations and considerations. It will also seriously impair the
liberal exchange of ideas as between agencies and their staff members
which in many instances should be, if to be freely given, on a con-
fidential basis.
One of the proponents of the ABA proposals 9 concedes that the
agency in the decision making process should be able to "use its
expert knowledge and experience in evaluating and drawing con-
clusions from the evidence that is in the record."90 If one concedes
this much and views the agency's staff of experts as merely part of
the agency itself, as they appropriately are, then requiring the agency
decision as to adjudicative facts to be based exclusively on the
record 1 should be sufficient for the purpose of drawing the line in
this area. Some will object that drawing the line here does not give
a party access to everything that has influenced the decision making
process. However, if the process of consultation with the staff is
viewed merely as an enlargement of the experience, skill and judg-
ment that the deciding officer brings to his judgment making task,
it is clear that ordinarily the parties, whether the proceeding be
judicial or administrative, would have little opportunity to examine
the decision making process to the extent contemplated by the re-
vised Model Act. As an ideal, it might be desirable for any decision
maker to explain and rationalize completely his decision setting
forth everything extraneous to the record he may have remotely
considered beyond what is reflected by the written opinion (includ-
ing, for example, the elementary accounting text he relied upon in
order to distinguish between a debit and credit); however, tradition
and expediency necessitate that parties be limited in this regard by
the somewhat inadequate opportunities available in connection with
a petition for rehearing.
80 The ABA proposal in this area is not identical to the Model Act provision in that
although it restricts ex parte consultations in a similar manner, it does permit em-
ployees who have not participated in the investigation or the proceeding and who
are not engaged in other prosecutory functions for the agency to be consulted "in
analyzing and appraising the record for decision." Proposed Code of Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure § 1005 (c).
00 Benjamin, supra note 45, at 230.
" Section 9 (g) of the revised Model Act would accomplish this purpose. See text
of article at note 72 supra. This is not, of course, where Mr. Benjamin would draw
the line. Ibid.
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The Kentucky proposed act would utilize disclosure of staff mem-
oranda and data as a discovery device, requiring, except to the extent
the material is protected as privileged or confidential, that notice of
the existence of (with opportunity to examine) pertinent staff memo-
randa and data be made part of the notice initiating the proceeding. 2
To the extent this would make available to the respondents a list
of the agency's prospective witnesses and a summary of their prob-
able testimony, the author would endorse the proposal, particularly
in the absence of other discovery procedures. 3 Presumably, such
matters as strategy to be pursued and policies to be advanced in the
proceeding would be protected as privileged or confidential.
F. Separation of Functions
The ironic facet of the revised Model Act is the fact that it does
not assure effective separation of functions. The draftsmen appar-
ently assumed that by cutting off substantially all consultation with
the staff, separation of functions would be achieved. However, noth-
ing in the Model Act as revised precludes one who has participated
in the investigation, preparation or presentation of the agency's
case from also acting as a hearing officer or deciding officer, and, to
the extent agency members are permitted to consult with staff mem-
bers, nothing precludes consultation with staff members who have
participated in the investigation, preparation and presentation of
the agency's case.
Yet the really objectionable feature of the institutional decision
arises out of the possible failure to separate functions. The problem
essentially is to avoid contaminating the decision making function
by the prosecuting function. It is obvious that the prosecutor does
not make a good judge in his own case. There are many choices in
this area, but the basic choices are among (1) complete separation,
(2) internal separation, and (3) no separation. Although the third
choice appears to be practiced by some administrative agencies, it
is doubtful whether anyone, would attempt to make a case for this
alternative except possibly on the basis that in view of limited staff
and budget, it may be unavoidable for some agencies. A case can be
made for complete separation, and there are various proposals on the
federal level to accomplish complete separation within certain agen-
cies. In certain areas complete separation substantially exists in
'1 See text of article at note 61 supra.
08 See text of article at note 62 supra.
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the National Labor Relations Board.94 However, complete separa-
tion is a radical solution in the sense that it would require very
basic structural changes in all administrative agencies and would
involve the type of controversial question that would probably make
reform in this area unattainable because of lack of agreement. Fur-
ther, complete separation denies to administrative "judges" any
utilization of a staff, separates policy formulation through adjudica-
tion from policy formulation through rule making, and is likely to
delay unnecessarily the development of standards.95 The need for
complete separation has yet to be established. 0 Internal separation
can and should be achieved, as it has to a large extent on the federal
level, by precluding those members of the agency staff who have en-
gaged in or are directly responsible for the investigation, prepara-
tion or presentation of the agency's case from participating in any
aspect of the hearing or decision making process, including the
writing of opinions.T Provision should be made to permit agencies
with small staffs to borrow employees, perhaps from the office of the
state attorney general, to investigate, prepare and present cases in




Our faith in the efficacy of hearings has probably caused us to
extend hearing requirements to situations involving fundamentally
policy questions better resolved by reports, discussions, conferences,
and arguments rather than a trial type hearing which is best adapted
O'Separation is achieved by the National Labor Relations Board in "unfair labor
practice" cases (but not representation cases) by making the Board's General Counsel
solely responsible for investigation, initiation and prosecution of unfair labor practice
cases. 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958). The ABA proposals would establish
in the judicial branch specialized courts (or divisions of a specialized court) to which
would be transferred certain adjudicatory functions of the Federal Trade Commission
and other trade practice cases and adjudicatory functions of the National Labor Re-
lations Board and such other adjudicatory functions as Congress might from time to
time determine. See Benjamin, supra note 45, at 219-23.
9 Although there is some dissatisfaction with development of policy and standards
by agencies under existing procedures, divorcing the responsibility for formulation of
policy from the adjudicators is unlikely to contribute to the evolution of policy. See
FWRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTrATIVE AGENCIES-THE NEED FOR BETrER DEFINrroN
OF STANDARDS (1962).
90 While directed to the Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, the
Carroll committee remarks, supra note 28, support this conclusion.
97 APA § 5 (c). However, these provisions should be extended to all contested cases
as that term is defined by § 1 (2) of the revised Model Act.
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to resolving disputed questions of adjudicative facts. Procedures
appropriate for the adoption of rules and regulations ordinarily
differ from those appropriate to adjudication. If the problem under
consideration, for example, is a regulation requiring certain safety
devices on commercial trucks, opportunity for the interested parties
to effectively present their viewpoint is what is required, and this
generally can be accomplished without the trappings of a judicial
type trial. Presently among some state agencies persons affected by
rules and regulations having the effect of law often have an inade-
quate, if any, opportunity to participate in the rule making process,
and there often is no system available either for the giving of notice
of proposed rules or the publication and systematic indexing and
codification of rules. The revised Model Act 99 prescribes a procedure
requiring 30 days notice to interested persons by mailing and publi-
cation of the proposed rule and requiring that interested persons be
afforded an opportunity to present their viewpoints (by submitting
comments and in some instances in a public type hearing). It also
provides for the compilation, indexing and publication of rules and
for keeping the published rules current. The Model Act rule making
requirements are similar but not identical to procedures followed by
federal agencies in rule making, and to the extent these requirements
are adopted, they will represent a major contribution to administra-
tive law in many states.
However, it should be noted that the revised Model Act goes
beyond the Federal Administrative Procedure Act by requiring
notice prior to the promulgation of "interpretative rules and general
statements of policy."'100 In the author's judgment, since such inter-
pretative rulings and statements of policy do not have the force and
effect of law and do not control interpretation, the revised Model
Act provision imposes an unnecessary and unreasonable burden on
the day-to-day agency determination of policy and interpretation.
If the proposed provision extends to informal staff interpretations,
it will not only be inconvenient but impossible to comply with and
will destroy much of the administrative process as a living, vital,
flexible means of accomplishing informal adjustments.' 0 '
08 For an excellent discussion of this general problem, see Gellhorn, Administrative
Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962).
11 Revised Model Act §§ 3-5.
100 Official comment to revised Model Act § 3. This is accomplished by defining
"rule" in § (7) so as to include agency statements of general applicability which in-




A number of problems relating to judicial review of adminis-
trative action have given rise to considerable controversy on the
federal level, but they have not as yet been serious problems in many
states. These include problems relating to primary jurisdiction,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, and standing to challenge
administrative action. 10 2 In particular, states have generally been
liberal in permitting any person with a significant interest in fact
to challenge administrative action. The principal objective in draft-
ing legislation should be to avoid statutory language that might
restrict this liberal attitude; the Model Act provision could be
clarified slightly in this respect. 03
There are a number of problems relating to judicial review that
undoubtedly will continue to reach and trouble state courts. These
problems are discussed below and include the following: What
administrative action is reviewable? What is the proper procedure
for obtaining review? What are the mechanics of review? Upon
what is the review based? What is the scope of review? What are the
remedies available upon review?
A. What Administrative Action Is Reviewable?
Many statutes relating to administrative agencies and action
expressly provide that specified types of administrative decisions
are subject to judicial review. Generally, these review provisions
relate to administrative adjudication (contested cases), infrequently
to rule making, and occasionally to executive action. However, a
number of statutes in some states relating to agencies with powers
of adjudication do not include review provisions. On the federal
level there appears to be a reasonably well developed doctrine that
unless a statute affirmatively precludes judicial review, there is a
common law right of judicial review of administrative action.10 4 The
"agency statement" and when it is of "general applicability." See note 100 supra.
For the extremely important role played by informal adjustments in the administra-
tive process, see generally WOLL, ADMINIsTRA'rE LAw-THm INFORMAL PROCESS (1962).
202 In the area of standing in particular, the United States Supreme Court has
unnecessarily made it a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction." United States
ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). See also DAvis, op. cit. supra note
62, at § 22.04.
103 Section 15 (a) of the revised Model Act might be improved in this respect by
referring to one who is adversely affected in fact or aggrieved rather than merely to
one who is aggrieved as being entitled to judicial review.
104 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 62, at § 28.07.
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decisions on the state level are inconclusive.10 5 The Model Act as
revised expressly provides that final decisions in all contested cases
are reviewable by the courts 0 6 and that the validity of all adminis-
trative rules and regulations may be determined in an action for a
declaratory judgment. 07 The revised Model Act contains no pro-
vision for reviewing executive action, that is, administrative action
that can be classified neither as adjudication nor rule making. Yet
this is an area in which judicial review may be badly needed since
there are typically no procedural safeguards within the agency to pre-
vent arbitrary action. The difficult problem in this area is distin-
guishing between action in which the executive's discretion is to be
absolute (e.g., pardon and parole and commutation of sentences) and
action in which the executive exercises discretion which can be re-
viewed for abuse. The author would suggest a provision to the effect
that all administrative action is reviewable unless such review is
precluded by "law."'' 08 The reference to "law" as distinguished from
statute is to preclude review in those areas in which traditionally the
executive has had absolute discretion, including the discretion to be
arbitrary.
B. What Is the Proper Procedure for Obtaining Review?
The appropriate procedure with respect to judicial review ot
administrative action is sometimes prescribed by statute particularly
with respect to administrative adjudication. In the absence of statute
there are a number of possibilities, and the multiplicity of possible
proceedings on the state level has all too often resulted in judicial
roulette-select the wrong proceeding and you are out of court. 0
On the federal level, the injunction and declaratory judgment have
frequently served as a utility remedy in those instances in which the
statute prescribes no specific procedure." 0 However, the effective
use of the injunction as a remedy is somewhat limited by the sover-
eign immunity doctrine."' The liberal allowance of mandamus
sometimes effectively provides for both review of the area charac-
terized as executive action and for affirmative relief where needed." 2
101 See cases cited in Note, 16 Wyo. L.J. 308 nn. 3, 4 (1962).
108 Revised Model Act § 15.
10 Id. § 7.
108 Cf. Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.$. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
100 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 62, at § 24.06.
"
10 Id. at § 23.04.
TI' Id. at § 27.04.
112 See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. State, 369 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1962).
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However, there is again a real danger in the multiple system of pro-
cedures for review that the wrong proceeding may be chosen. Pro-
fessor Davis argues for a single proceeding to review administrative
action and the abolition of all other proceedings.18 Constitutional
limitations" 4 may preclude doing so in some states; hopefully, mak-
ing it clear that the proposed proceeding, although supplemental to
other remedies, is always available, may get the job done. The Model
Act provides one procedure for contested cases and another pro-
cedure for reviewing rules." 5 The author would suggest (following
Professor Davis) a single procedure (perhaps styled as a petition for
review) for the review of all reviewable administrative action.
Consideration should also be given to providing that jurisdiction
in all appeals from administrative action be placed, as would be the
case under the Kentucky proposed act," 6 in a single designated
district court.
C. What Are the Mechanics of Review?
Many statutes and court rules specifically prescribe the time
periods, papers, etc., governing appeals from administrative agencies
to the courts. The Model Act prescribes the mechanics for review
in contested cases," 7 and these provisions could be extended with
appropriate adaption to all judicial review of administrative action.
Since the Model Act is tailored to the precise situation of review of
administrative action, it may be better adapted to this purpose than
scattered statutory provisions and will in any event prescribe needed
uniformity in this area. Consideration should be given to clarifying
the issues by following the Wisconsin example" 8 which requires
that the petition for review set forth the grounds upon which relief
is being sought.
D. Upon What Is the Review Based?
Some state statutes expressly provide that review is to be based ex-
clusively upon the record developed by the administrative agency.
However, to the extent de novo statutes are given effect, the adminis-
113 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 62, at § 24.06.
114 Some state constitutions expressly purport to preserve all or some of the extraor-
dinary remedies.
115 See text of article at notes 106-07 supra.
316 KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE R.SEARCH Comm'N, supra note 3, at 89.
11? Revised Model Act §§ 15 (b)- (d).
I' 8 Wis. STAT. § 227.16 (1961). A similar recommendation has been made by the
Administrative Conference of the United States.
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trative record presumably can be supplemented by testimony taken
by the court.119 The Model Act 120 provides in contested cases for re-
view based upon the record developed before the agency, although
the court may order the agency (emphasis supplied) to take addi-
tional evidence if, upon application of a party, it is shown that
additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons
for failure to present it to the agency. The Model Act' 2 ' also per-
mits the court to take evidence on any alleged irregularity in pro-
ceedings before the agency not shown by the record. The Model Act
provisions will clarify the law in jurisdictions which permit the tak-
ing of supplemental testimony before the court. To permit such
supplemental testimony is to encourage poorly developed administra-
tive records. Since it is the judgment of the agency that is being
exercised, that judgment should be evaluated on the basis of the
record before the agency, and the parties should be evaluated on the
same basis.
Undoubtedly, some administrative agencies in the past have
failed to develop an appropriate record in contested cases and may
not even have had the subpoena power sometimes necessary for this
purpose. This encourages courts to permit the administrative record
to be supplemented. One of the advantages to a Model Act approach
rather than an ad hoc approach to problems arising in the adminis-
trative law area is the fact that it permits a comprehensive and
correlated approach to related problems. If the recommendations
made earlier in this article are adopted, the parties will have the
techniques available to both develop and preserve an appropriate
record, and the agency will have rendered a written decision setting
forth findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, again it
should be noted that this discussion relates to contested cases (adju-
dication) and not to other types of administrative action. It is
inappropriate in a contested case to engage in the presumption of
official regularity; decisions required by statute to be made after a
hearing should be supported by the administrative record. On the
other hand, in the area characterized as executive action, there will
be no record in the ordinary sense of that term and the record will
have to be developed by the court. It is also probably appropriate
119 This appears to be preserved by § 15 (a) of the revised Model Act which provides
that the judicial review provisions do not limit utilization of trial de novo as pro.
vided by law.
120 Revised Model Act § 15 (e).
221 Id. § 15 ().
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in this area to engage in the presumption of official regularity and
to require the party challenging the administrative action to carry
the burden of showing an abuse of discretion.
E. What Is the Scope of Judicial Review?
The problem in this area has been to reconcile the viewpoints
expressed in the quotations discussed below.
Justice Frankfurter, in sustaining a grain rate structure estab-
lished by the Interstate Commerce Commission, stated: "We [the
Court] certainly have neither technical competence nor legal author-
ity to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken by the
Commissioner." 122
Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, has eloquently stated
the case for judicial review, not in a civil liberties case, but in a
government contract case: 123 "Law has reached its finest moment
when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler,
some civil or military official, some bureaucrat. Where discretion is
absolute, man has always suffered .... "
On the federal level, scope-of-review criteria may be verbalized
in general terms. 12 4 The courts do not substitute judgment on ques-
tions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or on questions of
policy. On questions of fact they apply the so-called substantial
evidence rule, and on questions of mixed fact and law usually apply
the rational basis test. In the area of questions of law as such, the
'courts are free to substitute judgment. In terms of mixed questions
of fact and law, i.e., situations involving the application of a broad
statutory standard to a particular set of facts, courts sometimes sub-
stitute judgment in areas in which they regard themselves as being
especially competent.
On the state level, courts have varied in the degree of deference
paid to administrative decisions. In the area of mixed questions
and discretion, state courts are likely to talk about arbitrary and
capricious action and abuse of discretion, but it is believed that this
adds up to the rational basis test: that is, if there is any reasonable
basis for the administrative decision on a mixed question of fact and
law or question of discretion, the administrator will be sustained.
122 Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942).
123 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951).
1 See DAvis, op. cit. supra note 62, at § 29.11. Professor Davis undoubtedly would
regard analysis of Supreme Court holdings in this area as being much more complex
than reflected by this discussion.
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The Model Act quite properly, as is now required under the APA125
on the federal level, requires reviewing courts on questions of fact
to base their review of administrative decisions on "the whole
record."126  The Model Act also in large part adopts the criteria
outlined above as to scope of review except, as revised, it provides
for a "clearly erroneous" test as distinguished from a substantial
evidence test with respect to questions of fact. 27 Although the dif-
ference in formula can only amount to a difference in degree, it is
apparent that under the clearly erroneous test the court has some-
what more authority (without the right to substitute judgment) to
reverse a decision of an administrative agency on a factual question.
The author would favor this departure, for it tends to offset whatever
shortcomings may exist with respect to any system of internal sepa-
ration and to strike a better balance between the respective functions
of the agencies and the courts. Section 15 (a) of the revised Model
Act preserves de novo reviews where provided for by statute; con-
sideration should be given to completely eliminating de novo review,
particularly in those jurisdictions in which the courts have construed
away de novo provisions on constitutional or other grounds.128
F. What Are the Remedies Available Upon Review?
The Model Act129 appropriately precludes the reviewing court
from substituting its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence or on questions of policy. Accordingly, as
to such issues courts should ordinarily either affirm or remand the
administrative decision in a contested case.130 Obviously in the area
of rule making the most a court can do is to affirm or deny the
validity of a rule; the court cannot adopt rules for the agency. How-
ever, with respect to contested cases and executive action, it may be
appropriate in certain instances for the court to reverse or modify
the administrative agency and to finally dispose of the case, provided
such disposition does not require the court to exercise a discretion
1 25APA § 10 (e). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
12 1 Revised Model Act § 15 (g) (2).
127Ibid. The Model Act frames the rational basis test in terms of arbitrary or
capricious action or involving an abuse of discretion and, as revised, § 15 (g) adds
as a basis for reversal "clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
128 The revised Model Act provisions relating to de novo judicial review are found
at § 15 (a). See DAvis, op. cit. supra note 62, at § 29.10 for state decisions invalidating
de novo review provisions relating to administrative adjudication.
129 Revised Model Act § 15 (g).
230 Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
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vested in the agency. The Model Act1 1 as revised specifically per-
mits courts to grant such relief upon review in contested cases, but it
fails to expressly authorize affirmative relief against an agency in
those situations in which such relief may be appropriate.
Ix
CONCLUSION
The Model Act can serve as a basis for administrative reform on
the state level. However, as most recently revised, in many areas it
represents a retrogression. The revised Act unduly regulates the
work habits of the agency, unnecessarily formalizes their procedures,
precludes the agency from utilizing its staff to full advantage, and
fails to appropriately separate functions. It will, at the very best,
contribute to additional agency backlogs and, at the very worst, will
preclude agencies from carrying out their regulatory functions. To
adopt language of a Carroll committee report, 32 the revisions to
the Model Act evidence "far too much confusion between fair pro-
cedures and formal procedures."
131 Section 15 (g) of the revised Act permits the courts to affirm, reverse, modify or
remand the case for further proceedings.
"I2 See Carroll committee, supra note 12, at 2. The Carroll committee criticisms
relate primarily to the ABA proposals; however, there is sufficient similarity betwcen
the revised Model Act and the Proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedures
to warrant reference to that committee's comments. The Carroll committee, id. at
10, recommended against the enactment of a general revision of the Administrative
Procedure Act specifically referring in this regard to the Proposed Code of Adminis-
trative Procedure. The committee in effect concluded that the case for the Proposed
Code has not been established. The committee said: "On the other hand, the sub-
committee has received comments from 33 agencies which almost unanimously expressed
the fear that the proposed code would increase their difficulties in disposing of the
business before them, with little or no increase in fairness of procedure or quality of
decision. The study and thoughtfulness by the 32 agencies that came to the conclusion
shared by this subcommittee reinforces that conclusion, namely, that drastic tinkering
with the Administrative Procedure Act is undesirable at this time." Ibid. Senator
Dirksen of Illinois filed a statement of his individual views and apparently did not
join in the subcommittee's statement.
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